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Abstract
This paper provides a simple political agency model to explain the e¤ect of political alignment
between di¤erent tiers of government on intergovernmental grants and election outcomes. Key fea-
tures of the model are (i) rational voters interpret public good provision as a signal of incumbent
competence, and (ii) realistically, grants are unobservable to voters. In this setting, the national
government will use the grant as an instrument to manipulate the public good signal for the bene…t
of aligned local incumbents. Then, aligned municipalities receive more grants, with this e¤ect being
stronger before elections, and the probability that the aligned local incumbent is re-elected is higher.
These predictions are tested using a regression discontinuity design on a new data-set on Italian mu-
nicipalities. At a second empirical stage, the national grant to municipalities is instrumented with
an alignment indicator, allowing estimation of a ‡ypaper e¤ect for Italian municipalities.
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1 Introduction
This paper focuses on the implications for local public …nance, in particular, for intergovernmental grants,
of three common features of …scal decentralization. The …rst is that there is vertical imbalance i.e. degree
of decentralization in expenditures is signi…cantly higher than the degree of decentralization in tax revenue
collection. For example, data from theWorld Bank Decentralization Database show that on average across
over more than hundred countries and 29 years only over half of subnational expenditures are covered
by subnational taxes. This vertical imbalance between …scal capacity and …scal needs is mostly covered
by transfers from the central government.1 In some countries the allocation of these transfers is formula-
based, while in others it is discretionary, giving central government potential scope for using grants for
political goals.
A second common feature is that there are typically shared responsibilities between national and
local governments in the provision of complex and important services such as health and education. For
example, in the UK, the central government sets the school curriculum, and supervises exam marking,
but local governments build and run schools, and hire teachers. Again in the education sector, in Italy the
central government has sole responsibility for hiring teachers and deciding curricula, but school buildings
are under the responsibility of provincial governments (for high schools) and municipal governments (for
primary schools). At the same time regional governments are responsible for vocational training and
bursaries. This second feature means that it is plausible that voters may have di¢culty assigning credit
(or blame) for the quality of these services between a number of di¤erent levels of government.
A third feature is that local government is typically party-political : that is, mayors and councillors
have often party a¢liations, and the same parties operate at both the national and local level, so that
the national and local incumbent parties may be aligned or non-aligned.
This paper studies how these last two features interact to shape the design of discretionary grants, local
public expenditure and taxation, and local incumbency advantage. We take a principal-agent approach
to modeling the relationship between voters and politicians, as in Alesina and Tabellini (2007). The local
public good is produced from …scal resources (local tax revenue plus the grant) and also depends on local
incumbent e¤ort and ability. Both local and national incumbents are quasi-benevolent; local incumbents
care both about re-election and voter welfare, whereas national incumbents care about voter welfare, and
the election of aligned local politicians. We can show that in this setting, the national government will
give larger grants to aligned incumbents. This result is not new; Arulampalam et. al. (2009) have the
same …nding in a distributive politics model where a national government can “buy" support from swing
1These …gures are based on own calculations on data from the World Bank Decentralization Indicators, available at
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/…scalindicators.htm. In particular we compute averages over
108 countries and 29 years (1972-2000) of the ratios between subnational tax Revenues and grants as a proportion of total
subnational …scal capacity.
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voters for aligned local incumbents. What is new is that our result is established in a micro-founded
political agency model, where the mechanism at work can be identi…ed. Speci…cally, a higher grant raises
local public good provision, and the latter signals a higher local incumbent ability to the electorate. This
provides an incentive for the center to donate to districts with aligned incumbents. So, ours is a theory
of intergovernmental grants as arising from the manipulation of signals by the center, rather than by the
o¤ering of bribes by the center, in contrast to the standard political economy theory of grants (Cox and
McCubbins(1986), Dixit and Londregan(1995, 1998))
Second, we develop a number of empirical predictions of our theory. The …rst one, is of course, an
alignment e¤ect in grants. The second, which is new, is that a higher grant increases the probability of
incumbent re-election, so that there is an alignment e¤ect on incumbency advantage. Third, we predict
that the alignment e¤ect is stronger in election years than in non-election years. We also predict that
conditional on grants, (i) local spending and taxes are independent of alignment, and (ii) there is a
‡ypaper e¤ect i.e. a one dollar increase in the grants has a bigger positive e¤ect on local government
spending than does an equivalent rise in private income. These last two predictions suggest that the
‡ypaper e¤ect can be identi…ed by instrumenting grants by the alignment status of the local government.
We then take these predictions to an original data-set on Italian mayoral elections and public …nance
for the period 1998-2010.2 Italy constitutes a very good laboratory to test our hypotheses, as in Italy,
grants from central government to municipalities have a large discretionary element, unlike most other
OECD countries3. Our dataset includes almost 500 municipalities between 1998 and 2010, ruled by
elected local governments, and around 25% of their current expenditure is funded by grants from the
central and regional governments. There is no implicit or explicit formula for these grants, and each
year a Budget Bill determines total grant for all municipalities, and the distribution of this total. Local
taxes and fees cover most of the remaining 70% of local current expenditure. Local revenues are highly
dependent on a property tax, ICI, which voters pay directly to their municipality. Moreover in the period
covered by our data-set there have been three rounds of elections at the central level, while we observe
local elections every year. The incumbent party at the central level has changed three times (in 2001,
2006 and 2008), and each year local elections were held in a number of municipalities. This gives us the
variation in alignment that is needed to test our theory.
Our empirical strategy to identify the alignment e¤ects on grants and incumbent advantage uses a
regression discontinuity design.4 Speci…cally, we compare municipalities where the elected mayor is just
2Data of Italian mayoral elections are taken for the period 1998-2008, therefore for the last two years we included in the
sample only municipalities that did not have elections.
3Formula grants are extensively adopted, for example, in: Australia (82% at local level), Austria (98%), Denmark (97%),
Portugal (85%), France (95%), United Kingdom. Discretionary ones are highly employed, for example, in Australia (at
state level 90%), Czech Republic (88%), Turkey (100%). Data are our calculations from OECD Revenue Statistics, 2005
edition.
4The advantage of this design is that it overcomes a fundamental identi…cation problem—the potential correlation
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aligned with central governments with ones where the mayor is just unaligned, where “just aligned” means
that the mayor won the election with a small margin and that the mayor and the central government
belong to the same party. Using this design, we …nd highly signi…cant alignment e¤ects that are robust
across a number of di¤erent speci…cations, for both grants and incumbency. If a municipality is politically
aligned with the party in power at the central level, it will be rewarded with on average, 40% more grants
than unaligned municipalities. The probability that the aligned incumbent mayor (or his coalition) is
re-elected in the election is, on average, 30% higher than in non-aligned ones. Moreover, this alignment
e¤ect is stronger in the run-up to municipal elections than afterwards, in line with the theory.
The …rst empirical results tell us that alignment is potentially an appropriate instrument to use in
testing the e¤ect of the grant on local expenditure and tax revenues. So, we test the e¤ect of alignment
on local expenditure and tax revenues5 , instrumenting the grant by an alignment dummy and also the
margin of alignment. The over-identi…cation tests are passed, indicating that the instruments are valid
and thus that alignment has no e¤ect on local expenditure, independently of the grant. The IV estimates
indicate the presence of a ‡ypaper e¤ect. First, public spending increases by about 0.4 Euros per capita
for each Euro increase in grants. On the other hand, a Euro increase in private income has a negligible
e¤ect on public spending. So, the overall ‡ypaper e¤ect is around 0.4, in line with the results surveyed
in Inman(2008).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related literature. Section 3 intro-
duces the theoretical framework, and Section 4 presents the main theoretical results. Section 5 presents
some background information on Italy, data description and the econometric strategy. Section 6 discusses
the main empirical results on transfers, and Section 7 is devoted to the ‡ypaper e¤ect. Section 8 tests
the alignment e¤ect on incumbency, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work speaks to at least four related literatures. First, on the theoretical side, our paper develops a
new political economy theory of intergovernmental transfers based on a principal-agent model of multi-
level government. This extends the existing literature in two ways. First, there is now a huge literature
on political agency (summarized in for example, Persson and Tabellini (2000), Besley (2006)), which
stresses the role of elections in screening and monitoring politicians. However, this literature focusses on
one level of government, and has hardly considered intergovernmental grants. One exception is Brollo
between …scal choices and the ideological characteristics of its voters—to identify the alignment e¤ect on tax setting, grant
allocation and public spending. A similar approach, in the context of grant allocation only, has been used in independent
works by Brollo and Nannicini (2012) and Migueis (2013).
5 In the Online Appendix we propose two alternative exercise, where the dependent variable is in turn (i) municipality
expenditure net of (national and regional) grants, which corresponds to the sum of local taxes and fees, (ii) the total amount
of public expenditures. The results for the estimation of the ‡ypaper e¤ect are very similar and around 40%
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et. al. (2013), which shows how higher grants from central governments can have negative e¤ects on
the behavior of lower-level governments in that the higher the transfer, the greater the rent taken by the
lower-level incumbent, and when entry of incumbents is endogenized, the less good is incumbent quality.
However, in that paper, grants are treated as exogenous6. Our theoretical contribution is to endogenize
the grant in a setting very similar to Brollo et. al. (2013). So, this paper is the …rst, to our knowledge,
to study intergovernmental grants in an agency framework.
Our approach is also in contrast to a “distributive politics" theory of intergovernmental grants due
originally to Lindbeck andWeibull (1987), Dixit and Londregan (1995), and extended to a …scal federalism
setting more recently by Dixit and Londregan (1998) and Arulampalam et. al. (2009)7. This literature
takes a Downsian view; parties can pre-commit to intergovernmental transfers prior to the election,
and these transfers are observable by voters, both strong assumptions. In Dixit and Londregan (1998),
national parties choose intergovernmental transfers to maximize their vote share in the national election,
taking into account any redistribution of these funds amongst voter groups by state governments. They
…nd that the transfer from the center to a given state will be higher, the greater the average “clout"
of voting groups in that state, where “clout" depends on the relative number of “swing" voters in that
group, and how cheap those votes are to buy (the weight that voters in the group put on consumption
relative to ideology).
Arulampalam et.al. (2009) modify the Dixit-Londregan set-up to allow transfers from national gov-
ernment to impact directly on voters’ incomes, and assume that national governments do not contest an
election, but rather design grants to maximize the vote share of the aligned local candidates. Moreover,
they assume that if the local and national incumbents are not aligned, the “goodwill" or utility incre-
ment generated by the grant is shared between the local incumbent and challenger (the latter being by
de…nition, aligned with the national incumbent, as there are only two parties). Speci…cally, it is assumed
that the local incumbent gets a share  of the goodwill, and local challenger 1 ¡ = The qualitative
predictions of the theory depend crucially whether this share is greater than one half. This  is simply
taken as exogenous in their theory, and indeed cannot be meaningfully endogenized in their model. One
contribution of our theoretical model is that it e¤ectively endogenizes ; see Section 4 below for more
discussion.
On the empirical side, there are several related literatures. First, there is the literature on political
alignment e¤ects on intergovernmental grants. There are a number of papers that establish, for various
countries, that political alignment with the center generates higher levels of discretionary grant to the
6Bordignon, Gamalerio and Turati (2013) extend Brollo et. al. (2013) to allow for two “quality" dimensions of politicians.
Richer municipalities (with larger tax bases) are more likely to attract “productive" rather than “rent seeking" politicians.
In their paper, rather than grants, the exogenous variation is from the 1999 reform in Italy that gave municipalities the
power to set a surcharge on the income tax.
7 See Johansson (2003) for an empirical test of the distributive politics theory.
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local government, for example, Levitt and Snyder (1995) and Larcinese, Rizzo and Testa (2006) for the
US, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) for Spain, Arulampalam et. al. (2009) for India, Case (2001)
for Albania, Rodden and Wilkinson (2004) for India, Brollo and Nannicini (2012) for Brazil, Migueis
(2013) for Portugal. In particular, our theoretical …nding that alignment e¤ects are stronger in election
years is consistent with Brollo and Nannicini (2012), who estimate the alignment e¤ect on per capita
average infrastructure transfers from the federal government to municipalities in the last two years of
the mayoral term and in the …rst two years of the mayoral term. They …nd that aligned municipalities
signi…cantly receive more grants than unaligned one only in the last two years of the term.
Second, there is a large literature on incumbency advantage. In particular, several recent papers
use a regression discontinuity design in order to estimate the advantage of incumbency in elections,
relying on the fact that when the electoral race is very tight, the identity of the winning party is likely
to be determined by pure chance. The main contributions include Lee (2001, 2008), Lee, Moretti and
Butler (2004) and Ferreira and Gyourko (2009). The common …nding is that an incumbent policy maker
enjoys a considerable advantage in winning elections.8 Our approach di¤ers from the above because we
are not attempting to estimate the incumbent e¤ect as such, but we estimate the e¤ect of alignment
on incumbency, i.e. we estimate whether being just aligned with the central government increases an
incumbent mayor’s chance of being re-elected compared with a just unaligned mayor.
Third, our paper also relates to the large empirical literature on the ‡ypaper e¤ect (for surveys,
see Hamilton (1983) and Inman (2008)). One of the main problems faced by this literature is that
intergovernmental grants may be endogenous, and thus unbiased estimates of the ‡ypaper e¤ect require
either (i) identi…cation of truly exogenous changes in intergovernmental grants as in Dahlberg et al.
(2008), or (ii) appropriate instruments for grants, as in Knight (2002). Our work is a contribution to the
second strand of the literature; we are the …rst, to our knowledge, to use alignment as an instrument to
estimate the ‡ypaper e¤ect.
Finally our paper is related to Bracco and Brugnoli (2012) and Cio¢, Messina and Tommasino (2012);
they both analyze Italian local public …nance data to investigate the e¤ect of political competition on
policies. Bracco and Brugnoli (2012) focus on the e¤ect mayoral electoral system on grant allocation and
…nds that plurality elected mayors received less grants than colleagues elected under dual ballot system.
Cio¢, Messina and Tommasino (2012) …nd evidence of a political cycle for local capital expenditures in
those municipalities where the mayors are not politically aligned with the central government coalition.
8For example Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) …nd that, in the US, Democratic mayors who barely win an election have
about a 66% chance of winning the next election.
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3 A Theoretical Framework
3.1 The Environment
In a country there are two tiers of government: a central government, and l = 1> ==q local jurisdictions,
also referred to as municipalities. There are two parties O and U, which operate both at the central and
local level. Without loss of generality, we assume that party O is ruling at the central level and in a
subset PD of local authorities, while the complementary subset of municipalities PQ is ruled by party
U. The subscripts D and Q indicate that left-wing localities are aligned with the central government,
while right-wing ones are non-aligned.
In each of two periods w = 1> 2> the incumbent mayor in municipality l produces a local public good
via the following production function
jlw = I (ulw) exp(hlw + dlw)> ulw =  lw + Wlw (1)
where hlw> dlw are incumbent’s e¤ort and ability levels,  lw is local tax revenue (from a property or income
tax) and Wlw is a transfer from the central government. So, ulw is total …scal resources of the municipality,
and is also equal to public expenditure. Also, we assume that I (ulw) is non-negative, increasing in ulw,
and concave. Then, under these assumptions, jlw is non-negative.
Finally, the incumbent abilities dlw are determined as follows. First, the initial incumbent’s ability,
dl1 is drawn from a distribution with mean zero, where the distribution is common knowledge between
voters and the incumbent. If the initial incumbent retains o¢ce, his ability is the same in the second
period i.e. dl2 = dl1= If he loses o¢ce, dl2 = df>l> where dfl is the challenger’s ability, drawn from the
same distribution as dl1=
The order of events is as follows. In period 1, each incumbent mayor chooses hl1>  l1> l = 1> = = = > q,
and the national government chooses Wl1> l = 1> = = = > q=. Then, jl1 is determined via (1). Having observed
jl1>  l1 but not hl1> Wl1> the voters in region l vote in municipal elections for the incumbent or the
challenger. The winners take o¢ce in period 2 and choose hl2>  l2> l = 1> = = = > q. The national incumbent
does not face an election and retains o¢ce, and chooses Wl2 > l = 1> = = = > q in period 2.
3.2 Payo¤s
In each municipality l> there are a large number (a continuum of measure 1) of identical voters who have
utility
x(jlw> flw) = ln jlw + flw (2)
where flw is consumption of a private good. The private budget constraint of voter m in municipality l
at time w is flw = pm ¡ g( lw) where pm is private income> and g( lw) is the cost to the household of tax
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revenue  lw== We assume g(0) = 0> g0> g00 A 0, g() A >  A 0> so that g captures the sum of loss of
income and any of deadweight losses and compliance costs of taxation. This speci…cation is standard in
the public …nance literature (e.g. Bolton and Roland (1997)).
Substituting the budget constraint into (2), and ignoring pm , we get a voter payo¤ over government
policy of ln jlw ¡ g( lw). Moreover, following Dixit and Londregan (1998), voter y in municipality l has
an ideological preference for the incumbent, measured negatively by [l= So, voter y’s overall payo¤ is
ln jlw ¡ g( lw)¡[l (3)
We assume [l is distributed independently across voters and uniformly on [¡1@(2l)> 1@(2l)], with
l inversely measuring the dispersion of ideological preferences in municipality l. So, l measures the
strength of swing voting i.e. the sensitivity of voting choices to performance in o¢ce in municipality l.
The incumbent municipal politician is quasi-benevolent, i.e. cares about voter utility from jlw>  lw> but
also dislikes e¤ort and values the probability of winning the election slw :
 (ln jlw ¡ g( lw))¡ #(hlw) + slwYlw>  A 0 (4)
Here,  is the weight on voter welfare, and Ylw is the continuation value of o¢ce for the incumbent,
calculated at the point when policy is chosen at time w= In period 2> by de…nition, sl2 ´ Ylw ´ 0; it can be
shown (see the online Appendix) that Yl1 = Y for all municipalities, and sl1 is determined as described
below. Here, #(=) is a twice di¤erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex cost of e¤ort. We assume,
without loss of generality, that Y = 1> so the re-election incentive is measured solely by sl1= Overall, (4)
is quite a standard objective for the politician (see for example Besley (2006)).
The incumbent national politician is similarly quasi-benevolent, and also (as in Arulampalam et al.
(2009)) cares about the payo¤s of incumbents in aligned jurisdictions, and challengers in non-aligned













where the cost of providing Wlw to a municipality l is normalized to unity. For simplicity, we assume a
discount factor of one for all agents.
3.3 Discussion
The basic structure of the model is very similar to that of Brollo et al.(2013). The main di¤erences are
twofold. First, the details of the public good production function and voter utility function are somewhat
di¤erent, and second, more importantly, we endogenize the transfer Wl from central government. Note
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that a crucial assumption is that Wl is not observed by the voter at the time of voting; without this, grants
could not be used to signal. We believe that the assumption that Wl is not observed is very realistic;
voters typically do not understand the complex rules governing formula grants, much less understand
how discretionary grants are allocated. Finally, note that the assumption that the incumbent does not
know his own ability at the beginning of his term of o¢ce is a widely made one in the literature on
political principal-agent models (e.g. Persson and Tabellini(2000), Alesina and Tabellini(2007)); it keeps
the analysis tractable while allowing the incumbent to signal his ability via higher public expenditure in
equilibrium.
4 Theoretical Results
We solve the model backwards. In the second period, voter payo¤s are increasing in incumbent ability.
In fact, as shown in the online Appendix, incumbents of all abilities choose the same levels of tax and
e¤ort in the second period, so that the di¤erence in second period voter payo¤s over government policy
between incumbents with abilities d> d0 is just d¡d0= So, because incumbent ability is persistent, the voter
in l wishes to re-elect the incumbent only if the di¤erence between his expected …rst-period ability dhl1>
and zero, the expected ability of the challenger, is higher than the voter’s ideological preference for the
challenger, measured by [l= So, the voter will re-elect the incumbent if
dhl1 ¸ [l (5)
From now on, we drop time subscripts, as all relevant variables are …rst-period. So, we see from (5) that
the probability of the incumbent winning, sl> is generally
sl = Pr ([l ·∙ dhl ) = 0=5 + ldhl (6)
How is dhl determined? We can assume without loss of generality that the voter makes his inference
about dl by observing his utility from public good provision, which is
ln jl = i( l + Wl) + hl + dl> i = lnI (7)
Note that by the assumptions on I> i is strictly increasing and concave.9 Then, if the voter expects
e¤ort and the transfer to be at levels hhl > W
h
l > but observes ln jl> his inferred value of d
h
l must satisfy
ln jl = i( l + W
h





9This functional form implies that e¤ort and tax revenue are independent in the sense that C
2 ln j
CCh = 0. If the two inputs
> h are complements i.e. this cross-partial is strictly positive, Propositions 1, 3 and 4 would still hold. Proposition 2 instead
would not, as—conditional on grants—aligned mayor would exert less e¤ort and levy lower taxes.
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Then, combining (7), (8), we get
dhl = i( l + Wl) + hl ¡ i( l + W hl )¡ hhl + dl (9)
That is, voter expectations are rational, up to any error in forecasting Wl> hl=
The incumbent politician in l perceives his probability of victory to be the expectation of sl with
respect to dl= Combining (6),(9), we see that this is
shl = 0=5 + l (i( l + Wl) + hl ¡ i( l + W hl )¡ hhl )
So, local government l chooses  l> hl to maximize
(i( l + Wl) + hl ¡ g( l))¡ #(hl) + 0=5 + lshl
taking Wl> W hl > h
h
l as given. The …rst-order conditions with respect to  l> hl are:
+ l = #
0(hl)> i 0( l + Wl) + l (i
0( l + Wl)¡ i 0( l + W hl )) = g0( l) (10)
respectively. In equilibrium, expectations are rational, i.e. W hl = Wl> h
h
l = hl= So, (10) reduces to
+ l = #
0(hl)> i 0( l + Wl) = g0( l) (11)

















taking  l> hl> W hl > h
h
l as given. By the same argument, at equilibrium, the …rst-order conditions with respect
to Wl are
(+ l)i
0( l + Wl) = 1> l 2PD (12)
(¡ l)i 0( l + Wl) = 1> l 2PQ (13)
Collectively, these …rst-order conditions characterize any Nash equilibrium to the game between the
central government and the q municipalities. From these …rst-order conditions, we can then establish the
following results, all of which are proved in the Online Appendix.
Proposition 1. Alignment e¤ects on grants. If l is aligned, and m is non-aligned, then Wl A Wm =
The intuition is as follows. First, national government has a baseline incentive to give transfers,
because it cares about voter welfare. This is captured by the terms i 0 in (12)-(13). In addition, the
national government perceives that by raising Wl> there will be an unanticipated (by the voter) increase in
10
jl> and the incumbent will get the credit for this, raising the re-election probability sl= So, the national
government will want to give more to aligned districts, and less to non-aligned ones. This is captured by
the term li
0 in (12), and ¡li 0 in (13).
We can now compare our results to Arulampalam et. al. (2009). They assume that with alignment, the
“goodwill" or utility increase for the voter generated by the grant is all captured by the local incumbent,
but with non-alignment, it is shared between the local incumbent and challenger in exogenous shares >
1 ¡  respectively. Their Proposition 1, one of their main results, states that aligned incumbents get
higher grants, independently of voter responsiveness l when the share of credit going to the challenger,
 ? 0=5> because when this holds, a grant to a non-aligned municipality unambiguously bene…ts the
incumbent. In our micro-founded approach, building on well-known political economy models, we see
that the non-aligned incumbent gets all the credit i.e.  = 1=
Finally, note that Proposition 1 is a result for election years. By contrast, in the second period of
the model, there are no alignment e¤ects i.e. transfers to aligned and non-aligned municipalities are the
same. So, generally, our empirical prediction is that alignment e¤ects will be stronger in election years.
The absence of an alignment e¤ect in non-election years is an artefact of the simplicity of the model
and such an e¤ect could easily be introduced in a number of ways e.g. by supposing that the national
government cares more about voter welfare in the aligned municipalities.
The second result says that alignment e¤ects on local taxes and spending only work through transfers.
Proposition 2. No conditional alignment e¤ect on local taxes and spending. Conditional on transfers,
local tax revenue  and spending u =  + W are independent of alignment.
The proof of this is obvious from (11). Writing the relevant conditions out in full, for any municipality
l> we have:
i 0( l + Wl) = g0( l) (14)
So,  l is independent of hl, which does depend directly on alignment= It then follows directly from (14)
that tax revenue and expenditure only depend on alignment via transfers. We can now be more precise
about how transfers a¤ect local taxes and spending:
Proposition 3. E¤ect of Transfers on local taxes and expenditure. A given increase in transfers




iuu ¡ g00 A ¡1




iuu ¡ g00 A 0
The intuition for this result is that as the transfer W rises, the marginal deadweight loss of taxation
falls, encouraging the municipality to raise more revenue overall, and thus  does not fall one-for-one
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with W=
This result leads to a prediction about the ‡ypaper e¤ect in our model. The ‡ypaper e¤ect is usually
understood to be the stylized fact that grants have a bigger positive e¤ect on local government spending
than does an equivalent rise in private income (Inman(2008)). In our setting, households preferences
are linear in income (see (2)), so there is no private income e¤ect on government spending. However,
we see from Proposition 3 that gugW A 0> so our model predicts a ‡ypaper e¤ect of transfers. Moreover,
these results suggest a way of identifying the ‡ypaper e¤ect via the use of alignment as an instrument,
as discussed in Section 8 below.
Finally, we ask how the alignment e¤ect described in Proposition 1 impacts upon the fortunes of the
incumbent in an election. We have seen that higher transfers from the center lead to greater public good
provision, and one might expect that might help the incumbent win the election. It turns out that if all
voters are fully rational, that is not the case; rational voters “see through" the higher jlw because they
rationally anticipate that aligned incumbents get higher transfers.
However, it seems implausible that all voters behave like that; after all, the retrospective voting
literature demonstrates empirically that good performance is rewarded (see for example Fiorina (1978)
and Wolfers (2002)). This can be formalized in our model by assuming that there is a fraction 1 ¡ 
of the voters who are “naive retrospective" i.e. they are more likely to re-elect the incumbent if they
see that jl1 was higher (or equivalently, they received a higher utility ln jl1 ¡ g( l1) in w = 1). This can
be contrasted with the “sophisticated retrospective" behavior of the fully rational voters in our model,
who are more likely to re-elect the incumbent if they believe that dl was higher.10 Assume in particular
that naive retrospective voter y votes for the incumbent if ln jl1 ¡ g( l1) ¸ [l, where [l is distributed
uniformly on [¡1@(2l)> 1@(2l)], as for the rational voters. It is then straightforward to show that:
Proposition 4. Alignment e¤ect on re-election probabilities. Assume that municipality l is
aligned, and m is not. If some fraction  A 0 of voters are naive retrospective, and l ¸ m > the incumbent
is more likely to be re-elected in l than in m.
The intuition is simply that when voters are weakly more responsive in the aligned jurisdiction
(l ¸ m), alignment weakly increases e¤ort and strictly increases expenditure on the public good, thus
increasing the level of the public good itself, and this increases the attractiveness of the incumbent for
the naive retrospective voters.
10A similar result might be obtained with a multi-period model with solely forward-looking voters. In such a model all
voters would be more likely to vote for the aligned incumbent, as long as aligned jurisdictions kept on o¤ering more public
good for less tax. Nevertheless, the model would be substantially more complicated than the current one, as one would need
to include further assumptions as to what extent voters are forward looking, how much “memory” the serially-correlated
ability dlw has; it would also require the formalization of upper-tier elections.
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5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Background Information on Italy
In this section we present some relevant background information on the Italian electoral system and local
public …nance.
5.1.1 Tiers of governments, elections and parties
Italy is a unitary parliamentary republic ruled by a central government with three sub-national levels:
regions (regioni), provinces (province), and municipalities (comuni); the latter are the subject of our
analysis. Comuni are ruled by a city council (consiglio comunale), and an executive committee (giunta),
headed by an elected mayor (sindaco). Mayors are in charge of appointing the members of the executive
committee (giunta), to which tasks are delegated, including powers on land management and environment
(water, sewage, public hygiene), local transport, local police, culture and recreation, education (nursery
schools, complementary education services such as transport and meal service). Mayors also have some
discretionary powers on how much …scal revenue to raise.
Following a political reform that took place in 1992, mayors are directly elected for …ve-year terms11
and are subject to a two-term limit. Mayors and city council are elected together, with di¤erent rules ap-
plying to municipalities below or above the 15,000-inhabitant threshold (from now on referred to as small
and large municipalities), according to the latest available census data. Mayors of small municipalities
are elected by …rst-past-the-post, while mayors of large municipalities are elected by runo¤. This means
that if no mayoral candidate obtains an absolute majority, voters vote again on just two candidates, the
winner and the runner-up of the …rst round.
Generally speaking, in our sample period both at the local and at the national level, the political
system was dominated by two large electoral cartels, the center-right and the center-left. At the national
level, the center-right coalition ruled Italy from 2001 to 2006 and again from 2008 to 2011. The center-left
coalition, going from Communist parties to left-leaning Christian Democrats, ruled instead from 1996 to
2001, and then again from 2006 until 2008.
However, the two-tier electoral system means that the electoral cartels are less in‡uential in the smaller
municipalities. Speci…cally, in smaller municipalities, because of the …rst-past-the post system, there is
less incentive for small parties and independents to form coalitions to support a single candidate, whereas
in the larger municipalities, there is a strong incentive to …eld a candidate who can win at the …rst round.
Coalitions, when they form, are usually easy to classify as left or right, because they usually a¢liate with
a national party. This means that the party of both the winning mayor and the other contestants in the
11Four years if elected before year 2000.
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election is much easier to classify as “left" or “right" in large municipalities.
This is shown in Table 1, which shows the type of party (or coalition of parties) of the winning mayors
in all municipal elections from 1998 to 2008, using o¢cial data published by the Interior Ministry. Parties
were classi…ed as left or right, using the classi…cation in Table AA4 of the Online Appendix. However,
some could not be classi…ed, for example, the lista civica. Table 1 indicates that for large municipalities,
only a small fraction of the winners, about 5%, could not be classi…ed as left or right. However, in the case
of small municipalities, the reverse is true, and most of the winners, around 66%, could not be classi…ed.
Our study of alignment e¤ects requires accurate identi…cation of the party type (left or right). For this
reason, we do not include the small municipalities in our data-set.
Insert Table 1 about here
5.1.2 Local Public Finance
Municipality expenditures are primarily in the areas of land management and environment (waste dis-
posal, water, sewage, public hygiene), social services, education (schools, complementary education ser-
vices), local transport, local police, culture and recreation. Municipalities’ revenues come from two main
sources: transfers from upper levels of government (mainly the central government) and own revenues
(from own taxes and fees).12 The degree of …scal autonomy for comuni (i.e. the percentage of own …scal
revenues as a percentage of total current revenues) increased sharply during the early Nineties, when a
considerable part of intergovernmental grants was replaced by new local taxes, and it is now stable at
around 30%.
The main source of own revenue for Italian municipalities is a property tax, called ICI (Imposta
Comunale sugli Immobili),13 introduced in 1992 and applied to real estate; the tax base is represented
by the land registry income and mayors are free to set the tax rate within a given range (0.4% and 0.7%
of income). Other important source of own revenue are from the taxation of personal income, through
the national income-tax surcharge, a waste disposal tax (TARSU), and fees (for example on the issue
of parking permits and certi…cates, related to the occupation of public spaces and areas, on the use of
public billboards).
Most of the remaining …scal needs, about 30% of expenditure, are covered by intergovernmental
grants (mainly unconditional) from the central government. It is important to note that these grants are
not formula based. Every year, a Budget Bill determines the grant going to municipalities as a whole,
12The use of debt is strongly restricted by the so-called “Internal Stability and Growth Pact", through which the central
government limits the possibility of local authorities to incur debts, in order to comply with the EU constraints on de…cit
and debt. Moreover, the Art.119 of the Italian Constitution states that local governments can use debt …nancing only to
cover capital expenditures. Therefore, as our analysis is focused on current expenditures, we abstract from considering the
debt as an active source of …nancing.
13The property tax changed name, after a reform, in 2012 becoming IMU (Imposta Municipale propria)
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and how it is distributed across municipalities. In practice, this involves a common percentage change
(often negative in the last few years) for all municipalities, with an additional ad-hoc element, which is
more likely to follow political, rather than e¢ciency and equity criteria. Indeed, the need for a radical
reform of the whole grant allocation system towards a formula-based one has been widely recognized by
Italian legislators14.
5.2 Data Description
Our data set comprises …nancial, census, and election data at the municipal level from 1998 to 201015.
As described above, we restrict the analysis to large comuni. This leaves us with a sample of 526 local
councils and 4086 observations.16 Note also that, despite the fact the large municipalities only constitute
about 10% in terms of number of comuni, over 60% of the population reside in large municipalities, which
receive (depending on the year) between 64% and 71% of total central government transfers; detailed
…gures on grant allocation and population by municipality size are reported in Table AA5 of the Online
Appendix.
Local elections take place in each municipality every …ve years, but not all at the same time. The
large number of municipalities means that local elections occur every year in our sample (See Table 2
for detailed information). On the other hand, national elections have been held in 2001, 2006 and 2008,
and at every national election, there has been a change in the ruling government coalition (from left to
right in 2001 and from right to left in 2006, and again form left to right in 2008). Figure 1 visualizes
the distribution of local governments by winning coalition for each year of the sample period. The …gure
is divided into four panels; the …rst and the third correspond to periods when the center-left coalition
was in power at the national level, and second and the fourth correspond to the years dominated by a
center-right national government.
Insert Table 2 about here
Insert Figure 1 about here
In our regression discontinuity design (RDD) setting our treatment is the political alignment with the
central government. For this purpose we de…ne the alignment variable, DO, equal to 1 if the mayor’s
party-coalition is the same as the coalition in power at the central level. Table 2 presents information on
the number of elections by year and by winning coalition for aligned and non-aligned governments. It is
interesting to note that the sample is equally split between aligned and non-aligned municipalities.
14For example the national law n.42/2009 establishes the need to put in place a mechanism for the aggregation of the
necessary parameters to calculate standard expenditure needs. The aim of the reform, which is currently being implemented,
is to replace the old discretionary regime with a formula-based one.
15The dataset comprises electoral data from 1998 to 2008 and …scal data and controls from 1998 to 2010.
16This is the number of observations for which we observe no missing values for all variables of our dataset.
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Next, we construct our assignment variable for the RDD regressions, the margin of alignment, PD,
as the di¤erence between the percentage of votes obtained by the winning mayor and the percentage of
votes obtained by the runner-up if the winner is aligned with the center, and minus this di¤erence if the
mayor is not aligned. So, the sign of the margin of alignment is constructed in a way such that mayors
who are (not) aligned with the central government have a positive (negative) margin of victory. If the
mayor is elected in the …rst round (because he or she got an absolute majority), the …rst-round results
are used, if a second round is held, then second-round results are used instead, (Table AA6 in the Online
Appendix reports detailed information on …rst and second round elections). These political indicators
have been collected from the Statistical O¢ce of the Italian Ministry of Internal A¤airs.
Table 3 shows the distributions of observations between aligned and non aligned local governments
and breaks down the …gures by the margin of alignment. Overall we have 4759 observations, but, if
we consider only elections close to treatment thresholds, namely with a value of PD less than either
5% and 2%, the number of observations reduces drastically to 536 and 221 respectively; however the
proportion of aligned and non-aligned municipalities remains virtually unchanged. Tables AA7 and AA8
of the Online Appendix report disaggregated information on the number of elections held in each year
by winning coalition and alignment status.
Insert Table 3 about here
Our main dependent variables are: (i) current transfers from the central government to municipalities
and (ii) local tax revenue. We focus on current expenditures and transfers because they are more likely
to track the yearly decisions of central governments at any point in time, unlike investment expenditures,
which tend to be set for longer periods of time. All these variables are expressed in real per capita values
and data are taken from the Italian Ministry of Internal A¤airs. In particular, current transfers from the
central government to municipalities are the item “trasferimenti correnti dallo Stato" in the municipality
balance sheet.
Moreover we employ a set of other controls which are generally thought to a¤ect local public …nance
outcomes. First, we include variables measuring socio-demographic and geographical characteristics of
municipalities, comprising resident population, proportion of population less than 14 and over 65 years
old (the source of these variables is the Italian Institute of National Statistics (ISTAT)). Second, we
include economic variables, comprising income per capita from real estate and from other sources. The
sources for these variables are the Ministry of Finance the Ministry of Interior.
Third, we include other political controls. First, we have dummies recording whether the incumbent
mayor (or party) has been re-elected, if the mayor is elected at the second round, and if the municipality
is aligned with the regional government. Moreover we also include dummies for political orientation both
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at the local and national level (the former equal to one if the mayor is supported by a center-left coalition
and that latter equal to one if a center-left government is in power at the national level). Finally, we
include an electoral cycle variable that records the number of years since the last local election. The
sources for these variables are the Ministry of Interior.
Descriptive statistics for all the variables employed in the regressions are given in Table 4; …gures refer
to statistics for the full sample as well as for restricted samples, i.e. for local governments that are close
to the treatment threshold, namely within a PD of …ve and two percentage points.
Insert Table 4 about here
Looking at average per capita data for the full sample we can see that comuni’s current public expen-
ditures amount to 790 Euros per capita, 20% of which is funded by grants from the central government.
Figures for the restricted versions of the data set (PD ? 5%> PD ? 2%) are similar. Looking at our
main controls, the values of the standard deviations suggest that there is a lot of variation within each
variable included in the data set but not much di¤erence between the three samples.
As a further description of the data, Table AA3 of the Online Appendix presents summary statistics
for aligned and non-aligned local governments. We can observe that, municipalities aligned with the
central government coalition signi…cantly enjoy more grants from the central government (177.42 and
132.50 Euros per capita), and raise lower taxes (236.88 and 250.85). Finally, note that our samples are
almost equally split between aligned and unaligned municipalities, which is the treatment variable we are
interested in for the purposes of our analysis.
6 Alignment and Transfers
6.1 Estimation Strategy
In this section we test the prediction of Proposition 1 on the e¤ect of alignment on grant allocation. We
use regression discontinuity design (RDD) to address the identi…cation problem in generating unbiased
estimates of this alignment e¤ect. The problem is that political alignment is determined by local charac-
teristics that are unknown or unobservable by the researcher. To deal with this, we exploit the fact that
alignment with the party ruling at the central government changes discontinuously at 50% of the vote
share of local parties. This allows us to use sharp regression discontinuity design.
Following this approach, we compare municipalities where the elected mayor is barely aligned with
central governments with those where the mayor is barely unaligned, where “barely aligned” means that
the mayor won the election with a tight margin and that the mayor and the central government belong
to the same party. Lee (2001, 2008) show that this approach represents quasi-random variation in party
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winners, because—as long as there are some unpredictability in voting behavior—when the race is very
tight, the identity of the winning party is likely to be determined by pure chance.
There are various ways in which RDD can be implemented using both parametric and non parametric
analyses; see Lee and Lemieux (2010) for an excellent survey. The simplest approach is to compare policy
outcomes just around the treatment threshold; however this method can produce imprecise estimates and
has to rely on a large sample size. Given the relatively limited number of observations available to us
around the treatment threshold, our preferred strategy is to use an alternative approach which is based
on the use of all available data together with a control function. This approach consists on regressing the
dependent variable on a pth-order polynomial in the control function, in addition to the binary treatment
indicator.
The model we estimate takes the following form:
lnWl>w = 0DOl>w + i(PDl>w;DOl>w) + 
0[l>w + )w + l + yl>w (15)
where Wlw> is the per capita grant to municipality l at time w> and DOl>w is our alignment dummy that
takes value of one if the ruling party at the local level in municipality l is the same as the party in power
at the central level; this is our treatment variable. Finally, PDl>w, the margin of alignment, already
de…ned above, is our assignment variable. Recall that all observations with a positive (negative) PDl>w
are municipalities which are aligned (unaligned) with the central government, and observations with a
small PDl>w in absolute value refer to mayors who won the elections with a very small margin.17
We allow i(PDl>w;DOl>w) to be a swk order polynomial in PDl>w> with coe¢cients all interacted
with DOlw.18 Finally [lw is a vector of control variables, )w is a year dummy, and l is the unobserved
heterogeneity. We treat l as a municipality …xed e¤ect. The coe¢cient of interest is 0> which is our
alignment e¤ect at the zero threshold, and, following Proposition 1, its expected sign is positive.
As pointed out by Imbens and Lemieux (2008), the above estimation method may be sensitive to
outcome values for observations far away from the threshold. To address this issue, as a robustness
check, we also implement the local linear regression approach, which restricts the sample to municipalities
in the interval PDl>w 2 [¡k>+k], where k is an optimally chosen bandwidth, here selected following the
methodology suggested by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2009).
17 It is important to emphasize that both the alignment dummy and the assignment variable refer to the previous year’s
observation. This is due to the fact that, in the sample, local and central elections have been held always between April
and June, while the allocation of grants is decided by the central government by the end of December and the local …scal
policy is decided by local councils usually not later than March.
18That is, our control function is: i = 01PDlw + 02PD
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6.2 The E¤ect of Alignment on Grants
In this section we present the results on the alignment e¤ect on grants. The results are displayed in Table
5. As the dependent variable is the log of the per capita grant, the coe¢cient 0 in equation (15) has the
interpretation of the percentage change in per capita transfer due to the alignment e¤ect.19 In all our
speci…cations standard errors are clustered at municipal level.
The table is divided into three panels. In the …rst panel we display results for the so-called OLS
regression model (which corresponds to equation (15) in the case of zero-order polynomial in the control
function). In the second panel we report the estimated 0 in equation (15) considering the optimal
polynomial order in the control function (according to tests reported in Table A1, the optimal polynomial
order is the the 4th). The coe¢cients’ point estimates obtained considering all polynomial orders are
displayed in Table AA1 of the Online Appendix. We produce two sets of results, the …rst one generated
by employing the full RDD sample, and the second one by restricting the sample to those municipalities
whose mayor was elected in the second round. By doing so we address a possible concern on the robustness
of our results due to the fact that PD is calculated in the same way (i.e. as the percentage di¤erence
in the votes between the winner and the runner up) for elections where the mayor is elected in the …rst
round and for those decided in a second round.20
Finally, in the bottom panel we report the results for the local linear regression model, where the
sample is restricted to observations within an optimally chosen bandwidth, calculated following Imbens
and Kalyanaraman (2009), using the full RDD sample. As a robustness checks we also present results for
when the sample is restricted to double as well as half the optimal bandwidth size.
For each speci…cation we propose three variations. In the …rst column, we run the regressions without
additional controls, in the second one we include the full set of controls listed in Table 4 as well as year
dummies, in the third column we also include a municipality …xed e¤ect. As pointed out by Pettersson-
Lindbom (2008), the inclusion of these additional covariates is a way of checking whether alignment status
is as good as randomly assigned (conditional on i(PDlw;DOlw)) and it should not signi…cantly a¤ect the
estimate of the alignment e¤ect. Finally, the last column reports the number of observations.
Insert Table 5 about here
19 In a previous working paper version of this paper Bracco, Porcelli and Redoano (2013) we present results when the
variables are in level, which are qualitatively similar.
20Recall that second-round elections are, by de…nition, elections with only two candidates, while in …rst round elections
the number of candidates may vary. Second, the fact that a candidate obtains the majority of the votes in the …rst round
can itself be interpreted as a sign of high popularity (or, in other words, low political competition in that municipality).This
is clearly con…rmed by looking at the summary statistics for the …rst round election dummy reported in Table 4. Taking
the full sample, 44% of elections are decided in the second round, but if we look only at close races (i.e. MA less than 5%),
the proportion of second round elections goes up to 90%.
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A common denominator to all these speci…cations is that the estimated e¤ect of alignment on grants
is always positive and generally highly signi…cant. In order to obtain more precise estimates on the
magnitude of the alignment e¤ect in Table A1 we report the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) as well
p-values from the goodness-of-…t test (F-test), which provide formal guidance on the choice of the best
polynomial order.21 According to these criteria the polynomial order that …ts the data best is the fourth.
Using the full sample, this means that a just aligned municipality should receive between 36% and 47%
more grants than a just unaligned one. The speci…cations with and without controls produce very similar
results and it is consistent with the hypothesis that the use of the control function makes redundant the
inclusion of further controls. Also the magnitude of these coe¢cients is in line with the results obtained
from the local linear regression model using an optimal bandwidth, which, in our case, restricts the sample
to the observations within §13%PD. The estimated coe¢cients for the local linear regression model are
indeed between 0.33 and 0.44. Moreover it is important to note that RDD coe¢cient estimates are more
stable to the introduction of control variables than OLS coe¢cient estimates, showing that the control
function reduces the risk of biased estimates due to the problem of omitted variables.
If we consider only municipalities where the mayor was elected in the second round the number of
observations drops from 3141 to less than half (1263), but the results remain very similar to the ones
previously analyzed. Note also that for this sub-sample, the margin of alignment is on average smaller,
as can be clearly seen from Table 4. Full summary statistics for the sample of second round election are
displayed in Table AA9 of the Online Appendix.
Finally, in Table A3 of the Appendix, we show that the e¤ect of alignment on grants is stronger at
the end of the term, as predicted by the theoretical model. In particular, in Table A3 we estimate the
model (15) including, as an additional regressor, the interaction between the alignment dummy and the
electoral cycle, de…ned in section 5.2, which records the number of years since the last election in the
municipality. The coe¢cient of the interaction term is positive and statistically signi…cant. In the same
table we also provide a di¤erent speci…cation of the electoral cycle de…ned by a dummy for the last year
of the term. Again, the alignment e¤ect is stronger at the end of the term. These last …ndings are in line
with Brollo and Nannicini(2012).
6.3 Graphical Analysis
It is also interesting to look at the graphical representation of our RDD results displayed in Figures 2(a)
and 2(b). Each …gure shows the margin of alignment, PD> on the horizontal axis, and the per capita
grant allocated to each municipality on the vertical axis. Figure 2(a) reports the …tted values from a
21Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), this is obtained by jointly testing the signi…cance of a set of bin dummies included
as additional regressors in the model. The bin width used to construct the bin dummies is 0.02. A bin width of 0.01 has
not been used because was generating to much collinearity in relation to the size of the sample.
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running-mean smoothing of per capita grants …tted over the interval [-40, +40] in the PD> performed
separately on each side of the cuto¤ point, as well as the 95% con…dence intervals. Following Lee and
Lemieux (2010) we include 50 bins in all …gures. Figure 2(b) reports graphical representation of the local
linear regression model of per capita grants in the PD …tted over the optimal bandwidth.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The …gures also help with the visualization of the estimated equation (15) to highlight not only the
values of 0> the “jump" in the dark line at the zero threshold, but also the shape of the relationship
between the outcome variable and the assignment variable. Figure 2(a) not also clearly shows the dis-
continuity in the distribution of grants between aligned and unaligned municipalities at PD = 0 but also
the fact the all aligned municipalities enjoy overall more grant than unaligned ones.
Further analysis in support of the correctness of the procedure we implement is provided in Figure
A1 and Table A2. Using the McCrary (2008) procedure, Figure A1 shows a graph of the distribution of
PD computed over bins with a bandwidth of 0.01 (100 bins in the graph), along with a smooth 4th-order
polynomial model.22 The graph shows no evidence of discontinuity at the cuto¤. Therefore, there is no
statistical evidence of manipulation of the assignment variable around the cuto¤. Another important test
for the validity of the RD design is to examine whether the covariates do not exhibit any discontinuity
in relation to PD. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) we test the null of discontinuities in all
covariates simultaneously estimating a set of regressions where each covariate is a dependent variable, and
the explanatory variables are DO> and the polynomial in PD= This system is estimated by Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR), and then we perform a chi-square test for joint hypothesis that DO is
insigni…cant in all regressions (zero discontinuity). As reported in Table A2 we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of zero discontinuity in all covariates in relation to almost all polynomial orders of the margin of
victory. Therefore, we can conclude that there is no statistical evidence of discontinuity in the covariates.
7 The Turnover of Incumbents
We now investigate our prediction that the probability of the incumbent mayor being re-elected is higher
when aligned with the central government. To this, we estimate the following model:
Ll>h+1 = 1DOl>h + i(PDl>h;DOl>h) + 
0[l>h + h + l + yl>h (16)
Note that the temporal unit is now election years, h. The outcome variable is now Ll>h+1> which is equal
to one if the winner of the local election at time h+1 is the same (or at least belongs to the same party)
22Higher order polynomial produce very similar results.
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as the winner in the previous election (held at time h) and zero otherwise. As before, i(PDl>h;DOl>h) is a
polynomial function of up to fourth order in PDl>h, where the coe¢cients are interacted with DOl>h= The
coe¢cient of interest is 1> which is our alignment e¤ect on the probability of incumbent re-election; 1
should be interpreted as the di¤erence between the (absolute) probability of re-election of the aligned
incumbent and the unaligned one. We expect 1 to be positive.
The variable Ll>h+1 is calculated in two ways. First, we use a broad de…nition of incumbent, incumbent
party, under which Ll>h+1 is equal to 1 if the winning mayor at elections held at time h+1 in municipality
l belongs to the same coalition as the winner of the elections at time h; this is quite consistent with
the Italian case where usually the deputy mayor steps in when the incumbent mayor cannot re-run for
elections. Second, we consider a narrower de…nition, incumbent candidate, where Ll>h+1 is equal to 1
only if the incumbent mayor is re-elected for the second time at h+ 1 and zero otherwise. So under this
de…nition we exclude all the cases where the mayor cannot run because of term limits (there is a limit of
two consecutive terms for Italian mayors).
Insert Table 6 about here
Table 6 reports results for di¤erent speci…cations of model (16), using the above two de…nitions of
incumbent. Note that the number of observations is now drastically reduced since we are only using elec-
tion years; for this reason, we display results only for the regressions where the full sample is employed.23
Note that in all speci…cations standard errors are clustered at municipal level. Using the AIC reported in
Table A1 in the Appendix, the polynomial order that …ts the data best is the second for both de…nitions
of incumbent, so we will base our discussion on this polynomial order. The complete set of results related
to other polynomial orders are reported in Table AA2 of the Online Appendix. Now our RDD sample
comprises 363 observations if we use the incumbent party de…nition for Ll>h+1 and 205 for the incumbent
candidate one. This relatively small number of observations explains why, when we estimate the model
using a high polynomial order, the coe¢cients tend to lose signi…cance. The estimated coe¢cients for
the incumbent e¤ect are between 0.20 and 0.31 (without and with controls) for the incumbent party and
between 0.25 and 0.35 for the incumbent candidate, which means that being aligned with the central gov-
ernment at the time of election gives local incumbents a strong advantage in comparison to non-aligned
ones. The inclusion of …xed and time e¤ects and controls does not a¤ect the magnitude or the signi…cance
of the coe¢cients.
23Regressions using only second round elections produce very similar results, but given the reduced number of observations
(127) standard errors are larger than when the full sample is employed, and this obviously a¤ects the signi…cance of the
coe¢cients. Output for 2nd round elections is available upon request.
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Insert Figure 3 about here
The graphical visualization of our RDD estimations is displayed in Figures 3(a),(b) and it is clearly
in line with the regression results. The …gures show the plots of the probability of re-election within each
bin against PD> the margin of alignment in the previous election. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010) we
include 50 bins in all …gures. We also report the …tted values from a running-mean smoothing of the
variable on the vertical axis performed separately on each side of the cuto¤ point (the darker solid line)
as well as the 95% con…dence intervals (the two lighter lines). Both …gures clearly show the “jump" in the
probability of incumbent re-election around the zero threshold. Note also that while the probability of
re-election for non-aligned mayors is strongly a¤ected by their popularity (i.e. the margin of victory) in
the previous elections, this is much less obvious for aligned candidates. At the right hand side of Figure
2(b), the …tted polynomial function is much ‡atter than the one displayed on the left hand side of the
…gure. This is consistent with the fact that marginal aligned mayors, facing potentially high probability
of losing the election, receive extra help, i.e. more grants, from the central government.
8 The Flypaper E¤ect
The …nal step in our empirical analysis is to trace the e¤ect of political alignment on taxes and expendi-
tures via the grant. Following Knight (2002), we estimate:
 lw = Wlw + 
0[lw + )w + l + yl>w (17)
where  lw is a measure of local tax revenue, to proxy for  in the theoretical model. Also, [lw includes
all the control variables employed in previous regressions and displayed in Table 4. Proposition 3 above
suggests that 0 A  A ¡1= Of course, Wlw is endogenous, and our previous results suggest that we use the
alignment dummy DOlw> as an instrument, which we know to be correlated with Wlw.
Tables 7 reports the main results for model (17). In Table 7, the dependent variable is municipality
core tax revenue, which comprises revenue from the (ICI) and the personal income tax, the two main
source of municipal tax revenue. As a robustness check we also experiment with alternatives dependent
variables (see Tables AA10 and AA11 in the Online Appendix): (i) municipality expenditures net of
(national and regional) grants, i.e. revenues from taxes and fees and (ii) municipality expenditures.
In all speci…cations, we report standard errors clustered at municipal level, which are robust for serial
correlation and heteroscedasticity. We also include time dummies and the full set of controls. Due to
space constraints, the coe¢cients on the controls are not reported, with the exception of the per capita
private sector income (the variable “income per capita" in the tables), as this is needed for the calculation
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of the ‡ypaper e¤ect.24 Finally, municipality …xed e¤ects are included in all speci…cations.
Let us discuss the results displayed in Table 7. The …rst column presents the results when equation
(17) is estimated by OLS and Wlw is treated as exogenous; in the following columns we present results for
the 2SLS when Wlw is instrumented with (i) the alignment dummy only; (ii) the alignment dummy as well
as the fourth order polynomial function inPD; (iii) the alignment dummy, and the …rst order polynomial
function in PD, and we restrict the sample to those observations falling within the optimal bandwidth
employed in the local linear regression on grants above. For the 2SLS speci…cations, we include …rst and
second stage regression outputs.
Insert Table 7 about here
When grants are not instrumented (column 1) our results suggest that an increase of 1 Euro per
capita in grants reduces local taxes by 0.167 Euros, which means that there is an increase of overall
public spending of about 0.83 Euros per capita. By contrast, conditional on the grant, a 1 Euro per
capita increase in private income has no e¤ect on public spending. The ‡ypaper e¤ect can be then
measured as the di¤erence between one plus the coe¢cient on the grant, and the coe¢cient on private
income. So when grants are not instrumented, the ‡ypaper e¤ect in Italian municipalities is calculated
to be around 83% percent (1-0.169=0.83).
However the tests reported at the bottom of Table 7 indicate that the grants are endogenous (Hausman
test) and that the alignment dummy is a good instrument for it (Sargan-Hansen test), so in the following
column of the table we report results for IV estimation. When grants are instrumented (column 2 ) with
the alignment dummy, the coe¢cient on grants becomes now -0.571, and it is signi…cant at 1%. Private
income per capita becomes signi…cantly positive; however, the size of the e¤ect is very small (a 1 Euro
increase in private income gives at most a 1 cent increase in core tax revenue). Overall the extent of
the ‡ypaper e¤ect decreases, going down to 0.43% (i.e. 1+(-0.571+0.006)). This means that public
spending increases of about 0.43 Euros per capita for each Euro increase in grants. This estimate is
almost unchanged when we add a fourth-order polynomial in PD as an additional instrument in column
3. The Sargan-Hansen test displayed at the bottom of the panel suggests that the excluded instruments
are valid instruments. Moreover in both cases, an F-statistic on the signi…cance of the …rst stage regressor
is very large, suggesting that weak instruments are not a problem (Staiger and Stock (1997)). Finally, in
the last column (column 4), we restrict the analysis to those municipalities whose margin of alignment in
previous mayoral elections was within the optimal bandwidth (i.e. a value of PD §0=13%). The sample
shrinks from 3527 observations to 837. The estimated coe¢cient on the grant is now -0.55. So, overall,
24This variable is de…ned as total income declared in the tax return minus real estate income, since real estate income is
used as a separate regressor to control for variation in the tax base of the property tax.
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the ‡ypaper e¤ect is estimated to be between 43% and 48%. This estimate is in line with other studies in
the survey by Inman (2008). In particular, Inman …nds that across a large number of studies, the ‡ypaper
e¤ect ranges from about 0.25 to 1.00. It is worth noting that our …nding (namely, that instrumenting
decreases the ‡ypaper e¤ect) is similar to what is found in Knight (2002).
In order to test the validity of our results with respect to di¤erent measures of  lw> we re-run model (17)
using municipality expenditures net of (national and regional) grants (which is equivalent to revenues
from taxes and fees) as the dependent variable. Table AA10, included in the Online Appendix, displays
the results for this exercise. In Table AA11 we displayed the results for the estimation of model (17)
using municipality expenditures as dependent variable. This speci…cation has been usually employed in
the past to investigate the extent of the ‡ypaper e¤ect. For both cases the results are consistent with
those displayed in Table 7.
9 Conclusions
This paper has explored both theoretically and empirically the e¤ect of political alignment on local
public …nance and elections. Our model predicts that aligned jurisdictions are assigned more grants by
the central government because a higher grant to aligned mayors (because not directly observed by voters)
signals higher competence of that mayor and thus increases the probability of their re-election. Moreover,
the model shows that part of the extra grants will be used to reduce taxes, and part to increase local
expenditure, implying a ‡ypaper e¤ect.
We test these predictions using a new data set on Italian local public …nance and elections over the
1998-2010 period. Our empirical strategy is based on regression discontinuity design (RDD), exploiting
the fact that being or not aligned with the central government changes discontinuously at 50% of the votes
at local election. Moreover, the RDD approach also provides a good identi…cation strategy to estimate
the relationship between grants and expenditure providing an unbiased measure of the ‡ypaper e¤ect.
Our empirical results are largely consistent with our theoretical predictions. In particular we …nd that,
if a municipality is politically aligned with the party in power at the central level, it will be rewarded
with an increase in grants between 36% and 47%; moreover, the probability of re-election of aligned
municipalities will be between 20% and 35% higher than for non-aligned local governments. Finally, we
…nd a positive ‡ypaper e¤ect; 40% of each Euro of extra grants will be used to increase expenditure and
60% will be used, instead, to reduce local taxes.
The theoretical and the empirical analysis showed, in the end, that when local governments are respon-
sible for the provision of local public goods, there is a perverse trade-o¤ between the level of discretion in
the distribution of intergovernmental grants and the disciplining and selection role of elections. In fact if
grants are not formula-based and voters attribute, correctly, most of the credit for providing local public
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goods to the local government, then the central government will tend to divert resources toward aligned
jurisdictions for electoral purposes, thus generating an ine¢cient allocation of resources. So, our analysis
provides another reason why formula-based grants are to be preferred to discretionary ones.
References
Alesina, A., Tabellini, G. (2007). “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task,” American
Economic Review, 97 (1), 169–179.
Arulampalam, W., Dasgupta, S., Dhillon, A. and Dutta, B. (2009). “Electoral goals and center-state
transfers: A theoretical model and empirical evidence from India,” Journal of Development Economics,
88(1), 103–119.
Besley, T. (2006). Principled agents? The Political Economy of Good Government, Oxford Univ.
Press. s
Bolton, P., Roland, G. (1997), “The breakup of nations: a political economy analysis", The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1057-1090.
Bordignon, M., Gamalerio, M., Turati, G. (2013). Decentralization, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, and
Political Selection, CESifo Working Paper No. 4459.
Bracco, E., Brugnoli, A., (2012). Runo¤ vs. Plurality. The E¤ects of the Electoral System on Local
and Central Government Behavior, Working Paper. Department of Economics, Lancaster University
Management School.
Bracco E., Porcelli, F., Redoano, M. (2013). Incumbent E¤ects and Partisan Alignment in Local
Elections: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis Using Italian Data, CESifo Working Paper Series 4061,
CESifo Group Munich.
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T. (2012). “Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal
Transfers in Brazil,” American Political Science Review, 106 742–761.
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R. and Tabellini, G. (2013). “The Political Resource Curse,”
American Economic Review, 103(5), 1759–96.
Case, A. (2001). “Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania,” European
Economic Review, 45 (3), 405–423.
Cio¢, M., Messina, G., Tommasino, P. (2012), Parties, institutions and political budget cycles at the
municipal level, Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 885, Bank of Italy, Economic Research
and International Relations Area.
Cox, G. W., McCubbins, M. D. (1986). “Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game,” The Journal
of Politics, 8 (2), 370–389.
26
Dahlberg, M., Mörk, E., Rattsø, J., Ågren, H. (2008) “Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify
the e¤ect of grants on local taxes and spending,” Journal of Public Economics, 92 (12), 2320–2335.
Dixit, A., Londregan, J. (1995). ‘Redistributive politics and Economic E¢ciency,” American Political
Science Review, 9, 856–66.
Dixit, A., Londregan, J. (1998). “Fiscal federalism and redistributive politics,” Journal of Public
Economics, 68 (2), 153–180.
Ferreira, F., Gyourko, J. (2009). “Do Political Parties Matter? Evidence from U.S. Cities,” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124 (1), 399–422.
Fiorina, M. P. (1978). “Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-
Analysis ” American Journal of Political Science, 22 (2), pp. 426-443.
Hamilton, B. W. (1983). “The ‡ypaper e¤ect and other anomalies,” Journal of Public Economics, 22
(3), 347–361.
Imbens G., Kalyanaraman K. (2009). “Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression Discontinuity
Estimator,” Review of Economic Studies, 79(3), 933–959.
Imbens, G. W., Lemieux, T. (2008). “Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice,” Journal
of Econometrics, 142(2), 615–635.
Inman, R. P. (2008). The ‡ypaper e¤ect, NBER Working Paper No. 14579, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Johansson, E. (2003), “Intergovernmental grants as a tactical instrument: empirical evidence from
Swedish municipalities,” Journal of Public Economics, 87 (5-6), 883–915.
Knight, B. (2002). “Endogenous Federal Grants and Crowd-out of State Government Spending:
Theory and Evidence from the Federal Highway Aid Program,” American Economic Review, September
2002, 92 (1), 71–92.
Larcinese, V., Rizzo, L., Testa, C. (2006). “Allocating the U.S. Federal Budget to the States: The
Impact of the President,” The Journal of Politics, 68, 447–456.
Lee, D. S. (2001). The Electoral Advantage to Incumbency and Voters’ Valuation of Politicians’
Experience: A Regression Discontinuity Analysis of Elections to the U.S.., NBER Working Papers 8441,
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lee, D. S. (2008).“Randomized experiments from non-random selection in U.S. House elections,”
Journal of Econometrics, 142 (2), 675–697.
Lee, D. S., Lemieux, T. (2010). “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, 48 (2), 281–355.
Lee, D. S., Moretti, E., Butler, M. J. (2004). “Do Voters A¤ect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the
U. S. House,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119 (3), 807–859.
27
Levitt, S. D., Snyder, Jr., J.M. (1995). “Political parties and the distribution of federal outlays,”
American Journal of Political Science, 39, 958–980.
Lindbeck, A., Weibull, J.W. (1987). “Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political
competition,” Public Choice, 52, 273–297.
McCrary, J. (2008). “Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: A
density test,” Journal of Econometrics, 142(2), 698–714.
Migueis, M. (2013). “The E¤ect of Political Alignment on Transfers to Portuguese Municipalities, ”
Economics and Politics, March 2013, 25(1), 110-133.
Persson, T., Tabellini, G. (2000). Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy, MIT Press.
Pettersson-Lidbom, P. (2008). “Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity
Apprach,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 6 (5), 1037–1056.
Rodden, J., Wilkinson, S. (2004), The shifting political economy of redistribution in the Indian Fed-
eration, Technical Report, MIT.
Solé-Ollé, A., Sorribas-Navarro, P. (2008). “The e¤ects of partisan alignment on the allocation of
intergovernmental transfers. Di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimates for Spain,” Journal of Public Economics,
92 (12), 2302–2319.
Staiger, D. and J.H. Stock (1997): “Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments,”
Econometrica, 65, 557 – 586.
Wolfers, J., (2002). Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections, Research Papers
1730, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
Appendix
Insert Table A1-3 about here
Insert Figure A1 about here
28
Tables
Table 1. Party affiliation of mayors in all elections (1998-­2008)
All municipalities Only < 15000 Only > 15000
No. % No. % No. %
Center-­left 20,641 23.69 16,588 20.68 4,053 58.54
Center-­right 13,413 15.39 10,924 13.62 2,489 35.95
Independents (Lista civica) 53,015 60.84 52,639 65.62 376 5.43
Missing 75 0.09 70 0.09 5 0.07
Total 87,144 80,221 6,923
Note. The table reports statistics on mayors’ party affiliation on annual basis for
the period 1998-­2008.
Table 2. Distribution of elections by aligned and non-­aligned municipalities
(regression sample)
year
Aligned Not Aligned Total
Center-­right Center-­left Total Center-­right Center-­left
Tota
l election
1998 0 23 23 21 0 21 44
1999 0 122 122 47 0 47 169
2000 0 26 26 19 0 19 45
2001 47 0 47 0 42 42 89
2002 59 0 59 0 68 68 127
2003 17 0 17 0 29 29 46
2004 43 0 43 0 144 144 187
2005 18 0 18 0 45 45 63
2006 0 62 62 44 0 44 106
2007 0 42 42 75 0 75 117
2008 34 0 34 0 23 23 57
Total 218 275 493 206 351 557 1050







Aligned 2,312 265 116
Not Aligned 2,447 271 105
Total 4,759 536 221















Current grants from central
government, real euro per-­capita 154.71 162.65 152.17 91.88 92.98 91.79
Current grants from regional
government, real euro per-­capita 45.56 47.26 46.45 41.24 46.08 52.83
Total municipal taxes (property +
income tax) -­ real euro per capita 243.96 229.20 250.72 85.63 79.75 69.77
Current municipal fees
real euro per-­capita 268.55 257.54 274.12 142.00 134.68 149.02
Current municipal expenditure
real euro per-­capita 790.57 764.97 797.97 203.71 202.18 183.81
1 = if incumbent mayor is re-­elected 0.7896 0.6521 0.5010 0.4078 0.4797 0.5107
1 = if incumbent party is re-­elected 0.8028 0.6782 0.5294 0.3982 0.4699 0.5066
1 = if mayor elected at the second
round 0.4406 0.9085 0.9049 0.4965 0.2884 0.2939
Margin of victory, municipal election 21.82 2.53 1.02 14.96 1.47 0.54
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
central government 0.4858 0.4944 0.5249 0.4999 0.5004 0.5005
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
regional government 0.5999 0.4384 0.5294 0.4899 0.4966 0.5000
Resident population 55,292 76,601 48,489 151,946 273,192 68,768
Percentage of residents under15 years
old 14.57 15.05 14.11 3.17 3.64 2.87
Percentage of residents over 65 years
old 17.54 16.90 17.96 4.53 4.49 4.26
Income different form real estate, real
euro per-­capita 16,851 16,873 17,590 3,263 3,409 3,083
Income from real estate, real euro per-­
capita 1,777 1,769 1,821 521 514 551
Electoral cycle (0 = election year,
4 = year before election) 1.84 1.84 1.77 1.37 1.38 1.37
Local government dummy
(1 = left council) 0.6090 0.4683 0.4661 0.4880 0.4995 0.5000
Central government dummy
(1 = left central government) 0.3137 0.3060 0.2805 0.4641 0.4612 0.4503
Note. Number of observations: All sample = 4,759;; MV < 5% =536;; MV < 5% = 221.







sample) 0.555*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 3546
(0.0324) (0.0218) (0.0314)
OLS regression (all
sample, 2nd round) 0.386*** 0.143*** 0.131*** 1431
(0.0523) (0.0343) (0.0444)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.475*** 0.364*** 0.365*** 3141
(0.157) -­0.105 (0.137)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.713*** 0.588*** 0.523*** 1263
(0.219) (0.147) (0.195)
Local Linear regression
(h) 0.326*** 0.403*** 0.439*** 856
(0.120) (0.121) (0.0930)
Local linear regression
(half h) 0.174 0.449** 0.301** 324
(0.183) (0.182) (0.137)
Local linear regression
(double h) 0.319*** 0.348*** 0.303*** 1750
(0.0792) (0.0838) (0.0643)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where
the winner and the runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal
population and population squared, income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of
population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time dummies are included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3.
Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear regressions is +/-­13. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at
5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level. The number of
observations drops from 3546 to 3141 because the lagged margin of victory is missing for the first year of the
dataset since we do not have election data for the year 1997.
Table 6. Alignment and the probability of incumbent re-­election
Coefficient on
Alignment
Panel 1: Incumbent Party
Obs.









Linear regression 0.0279 0.144*** 0.156*** 768 0.156*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 641
(0.0275) (0.0378) (0.0359) (0.0373) (0.0433) (0.042)
Second order
polynomial (RD Sample)
0.208 0.312*** 0.267*** 363 0.358** 0.314** 0.256* 205
(0.130) (0.101) (0.101) (0.140) (0.134) (0.141)
Local Linear regression
(h)
0.759** 0.521 26 0.623* 0.119 22
(0.356) (0.468) (0.357) (0.428)
Local linear regression
(half h)
0.840** 0.838 17 0.714 0.778 15
(0.387) (0.828) (0.470) (0.631)
Local linear regression
(double h)
0.631** 0.715** 42 0.611* 0.303 33
(0.290) (0.356) (0.300) (0.282)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where the winner and the
runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal population and population squared,
income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time dummies are
included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3, 5 and 6. Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear regressions is +/-­3.5%.
Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal
level. The number of observations drops from 641 to 205 because the lagged margin of victory is missing for the first year of the
dataset since we do not have election data for the year 1997.
Table 7-­ Testing for flypaper effect, determination of municipal taxes (Euros per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(baseline model) (polynomial instruments) (optimal bandwidth)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Taxes Grants Taxes Grants Taxes Grants Taxes
Variable
Grant -­0.167*** -­0.571*** -­0.526*** -­0.535***
(0.0181) (0.0834) (0.056) (0.076)
Income (per capita) 0.001 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.006*** 0.023*** 0.012***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Alignment dummy 12.73*** 41.86*** 22.28***
(1.368) (7.377) (6.427)
MA (fourth order polynomial) no yes no
MA (first order polynomial) no no yes
Observations 3527 3527 3527 3122 3122 837 837
R-­squared 0.424
F-­test on joint significance covariates
(F-­statistics) 86.59 19.22 32.24
Sargan-­Hansen statistic Chi-­sq (8) 4.757 (2) 0.360
Ho: valid excluded instrument (p-­value) 0.783 0.835
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Controls include: Resident population, Percentage of residents under15 years old, Percentage of residents over 65 years old, Electoral cycle, Local government dummy (1 = left
council), Central government dummy (1 = left central government), Municipal alignment with the regional government dummy (1 = aligned municipality), Current grants from
regional government (real euro per-­capita).






F-­test AIC F-­test AIC F-­test AIC
0 0.0883 3450.742 0.0969 596.109 0.5605 56.384
1 0.2128 3451.338 0.3802 599.719 0.5576 59.812
2 0.2322 3451.204 0.7173 603.011 0.6727 63.411
3 0.2866 3454.528 0.7893 605.798 0.7333 67.104
4 0.2563 3448.634 0.9586 606.434 0.9156 69.986
5 0.2345 3451.392 0.9388 599.423 0.8051 65.674
6 0.3804 3448.036 0.9226 595.748 0.8230 63.592
Table A2. Testing for the continuity of the covariates in close elections
Polynomial








Notes. The table reports chi-­square tests for the discontinuity gaps to examine whether the
covariates in the RD do not exhibit any discontinuity in relation to the margin of
alignment. As suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010) we test the null of discontinuities in
all covariates simultaneously estimating a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) where
each equation represents a different baseline covariate.





alignment dummy 0.087** 0.089** 0.311** 0.329**
(0.039) (0.036) (0.139) (0.144)
Electoral cycle 0.005 0.006
(0.012) (0.012)
Alignment dummy 0.025* 0.027*
X Electoral cycle (0.013) (0.015)
Electoral cycle 2 -­0.009 -­0.002
(0.045) (0.045)
Alignment dummy 0.110** 0.109*
X Electoral cycle 2 (0.055) (0.056)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 3546 3546 3141 3141
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in
brackets clustered at municipal level. Here, “e” denotes election year. Electoral cycle 2 is a dummy = 1 in
year before election only. In columns 3 and 4, the number of observations drops from 3546 to 3141
because the lagged margin of victory is missing for the first year of the dataset since we do not have
election data for the year 1997.
Figures
Figure 1. Yearly distribution of municipalities by winning coalitions
Notes: electoral data covers the 1998-­2008 period, however we retain in the dataset municipalities without
mayoral election between in 2009 and 2010. The (un)shaded areas refer to years when a central-­left (right)




















(a) -­ all sample
(b) – optimal bandwidth
Notes. The central line split the polynomial functions in the margin of alignment fitted
over the interval [-­40, +40] in panel (a), and over the optimal bandwidth in panel (b).
The lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are averaged
over 2-­unit intervals.
Figure 3. Probability of re-­election
(a) – party incumbent
(b) – candidate incumbent
Notes. The central line split the polynomial function in the margin of alignment fitted over the
interval [-­40, +40]. The lateral lines represent the 95% confidence interval. Scatter points are
averaged over 2-­unit intervals.
Figure A1. Density of the forcing variable
Notes. The figure shows a graph of the raw densities computed over bins with a bandwidth
of 0.01 (100 bins in the graph), along with a smooth 4th-­order polynomial model.
Online Appendix
Second-Period Equilibrium and Derivation of the Continuation Value Y
In the second period, the incumbent politician in l chooses  l> hl to maximize (i( l+Wl)+ hl+dhl ¡
g( l)) ¡ #(hl) taking Wl as given> where dhl is the expected value of dl conditional on the incumbent’s
information set at the beginning of period 2 (if the period 1 incumbent wins the election, he has enough
information to calculate dl i.e. dhl = dl> but if the challenger wins the election, d
h
l = 0)= The …rst-order
conditions are
 = #0(hl)> i 0( l + Wl) = g0( l) (A1)
At the same time, the national government chooses Wl to maximizeX
l2P
(i( l + Wl) + hl + d
h




taking  l> hl as given. So, at equilibrium, the …rst-order conditions with respect to Wl are
i 0( l + Wl) = 1> l 2P (A2)
Clearly, all these …rst-order conditions are identical across municipalities. We assume for convenience
that these conditions have the unique solution ^ > h^> W^ = Then, the continuation value to the incumbent of
winning the election, from the perspective of the beginning of period 2, is
(i(^ + W^ ) + h+ dhl ¡ g(^))¡ #(h^) ´ Y + dl
Now, at the time of choosing policy before the election in period 1, neither the incumbent in l nor the
national government have observed dl> or any variable correlated with it, so their expectation of the
continuation value is simply Y=
Proof of Proposition 2. First, note that Wl>  l> hl are determined independently from Wm > m > hm for
any two municipalities l and m= Moreover, the …rst-order condition for hl is independent of the remaining
…rst-order conditions. So, the conditions determining Wl>  l can be written
(+E)i 0( l + Wl) = ª0(Wl) (A3)
i 0( l + Wl) = g0( l) (A4)
where
E = {l ¡ (1¡ {)l
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¡i 0(i 00 ¡ g00)
G
(A5)
where G = g00 ¡ i 00( + E)g00 A 0 from i 00 ? 0> g00 A 0= So, consequently, from (A5), gWgE A 0= So, as
1
E = l if l is aligned, and E = ¡m if m is non-aligned, then Wl A Wm = ¤
Proof of Proposition 5. Expected voter utility in l is
H ln jl ¡ g( l) = i( l + Wl) + hl ¡ g( l)
We need to show that for any two l> m where l is aligned and m is not, that expected voter utility is higher
in l= Note …rst that from Proposition 2, 3, and 4,  l is lower when aligned i.e.  l ?  m. So, we need
i( l+ Wl) + hl to be higher than i( l + Wl) + hl. As hl is increasing in l> l ¸ m ensures hl ¸ hm = Then
note that from Proposition 2, 3, and 4, Wl A Wm , and thus, as  l falls less than one for one with an increase
in Wl>  l + Wl will be higher also. ¤
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sample) 0.555*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 3546
(0.0324) (0.0218) (0.0314)
OLS regression (all
sample, 2nd round) 0.386*** 0.143*** 0.131*** 1431
(0.0523) (0.0343) (0.0444)
First order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.263*** 0.257*** 0.265*** 3141
(0.0663) (0.044) (0.0572)
Second order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.462*** 0.323*** 0.289*** 3141
(0.099) (0.0652) (0.0816)
Third order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.571*** 0.414*** 0.432*** 3141
(0.128) (0.085) (0.108)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.475*** 0.364*** 0.365*** 3141
(0.157) -­0.105 (0.137)
First order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round ) 0.280** 0.333*** 0.335*** 1263
(0.112) (0.0718) (0.0852)
Second order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.124 0.289*** 0.254** 1263
(0.148) (0.0957) (0.117)
Third order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.423** 0.499*** 0.405*** 1263
(0.185) (0.119) (0.151)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample, 2nd round) 0.713*** 0.588*** 0.523*** 1263
(0.219) (0.147) (0.195)
Local Linear regression
(h) 0.326*** 0.403*** 0.439*** 856
(0.120) (0.121) (0.0930)
Local linear regression
(half h) 0.174 0.449** 0.301** 324
(0.183) (0.182) (0.137)
Local linear regression
(double h) 0.319*** 0.348*** 0.303*** 1750
(0.0792) (0.0838) (0.0643)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where
the winner and the runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal
population and population squared, income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of
population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time dummies are included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3.
Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear regressions is +/-­13. Significance at 1% is represented by *** ,
at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
 
Table AA2. Alignment and the probability of incumbent re-­election
Coefficient on
Alignment
Panel 1: Incumbent Party
Obs.









Linear regression 0.0279 0.144*** 0.156*** 768 0.156*** 0.119*** 0.128*** 641
(0.0275) (0.0378) (0.0359) (0.0373) (0.0433) (0.042)
First order polynomial 0.135 0.240*** 0.189*** 363 0.303*** 0.265*** 0.191* 205
(0.0845) (0.0641) (0.0648) (0.0960) (0.0933) (0.101)
Second order
polynomial (RD Sample) 0.208 0.312*** 0.267*** 363 0.358** 0.314** 0.256* 205
(0.130) (0.101) (0.101) (0.140) (0.134) (0.141)
Third order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.403** 0.403*** 0.335** 363 0.581*** 0.513*** 0.411** 205
(0.165) (0.134) (0.136) (0.179) (0.172) (0.186)
Fourth order polynomial
(RD Sample) 0.337 0.334* 0.287 363 0.555*** 0.423* 0.352 205
(0.209) (0.177) (0.184) (0.210) (0.215) (0.222)
Local Linear regression
(h) 0.759** 0.521 26 0.623* 0.119 22
(0.356) (0.468) (0.357) (0.428)
Local linear regression
(half h) 0.840** 0.838 17 0.714 0.778 15
(0.387) (0.828) (0.470) (0.631)
Local linear regression
(double h) 0.631** 0.715** 42 0.611* 0.303 33
(0.290) (0.356) (0.300) (0.282)
Notes. The table reports coefficients on alignment dummies. RD sample included all municipal elections where the winner and
the runner up belong to the centre-­left and centre-­right coalition. Controls include: municipal population and population
squared, income per capita, income per capita from real estate, proportion of population under 14 and over 65 years old. Time
dummies are included in all regressions in columns 2 and 3, 5 and 6. Optimally chosen bandwidth (h) in local linear
regressions is +/-­3.5%. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in
brackets clustered at municipal level.





Current grants from central government, real euro
per-­capita 177.42 132.50 44.92 0.0000
Current grants from regional government, real
euro per-­capita 44.33 46.86 -­2.53 0.1125
Total municipal taxes (property + income tax), real
euro per capita 236.88 250.85 -­13.97 0.0000
Current municipal fees real euro per-­capita 274.06 262.76 11.3 0.3266
Current municipal expenditure
real euro per-­capita 792. 8 788.88 3.400 0.3336
1 = if incumbent mayor is re-­elected 0.7827 0.7945 -­0.011 0.7184
1 = if incumbent party is re-­elected 0.7961 0.8098 -­0.013 0.9095
1 = if mayor elected at the second round 0.4403 0.4409 -­0.000 0.9647
Margin of victory, municipal elections 21.71 21.94 -­0.230 0.9746
1 = if municipality is aligned with the regional
government 0.6111 0.5880 0.0231 0.0809
Resident population 53,804 56,862 -­3,058 0.4200
Percentage of residents under15 years old 14.63 14.50 0.130 0.0114
Percentage of residents over 65 years old 17.42 17.68 -­0.260 0.0038
Income different form real estate, real euro per-­
capita 16,786 16,919 -­133 0.2338
Income from real estate, real euro per-­capita 1,779 1,775 4.000 0.8669
Municipal electoral cycle (0 = election year,
4 = year before election) 1.80 1.87 -­0.070 0.1343
Local government dummy
(1 = left council) 0.4928 0.7314 -­0.238 0.0000
Central government dummy
(1 = left central government) 0.3578 0.2673 0.090 0.0002
Table AA4. Political classification of parties (1998-­2008)
Center-­Left No. Center-­Right No. Independents No.
CEN-­SIN(LS.CIVICHE) 2,565 CEN-­DES(LS.CIVICHE) 1,245 LISTA CIVICA 265
CEN-­SIN 629 CEN-­DES 403 IND 57
DEMOCRATICI SINISTRA 246 FORZA ITALIA 251 SVP 20
PDS 193 LEGA NORD 181 UV 7
SINISTRA 140 CENTRO 127 PATTO SEGNI 6
L'ULIVO 84 ALLEANZA NAZIONALE 87 DEMOCRAZIA EUROPEA 5
P.POPOLARE ITALIANO 39 POLO PER LE LIBERTA' 30 MOV. PER L'AUTONOMIA 5
PPI (POP) 27 CCD 26 RINNOV.IT-­ALTRI 5
DL.LA MARGHERITA 18 CASA DELLE LIBERTA' 17 SI 4
RIF.COM. 17 CDU 14 LISTA LOCALE 1
LA MARGHERITA 16 IL POPOLO DELLA LIBE 13 PRI 1
PROGRESSISTI (1994) 8 LEGA LOMB-­LEGA NORD 10
CEN-­SIN(CONTR.UFF.) 7 LG.NORD-­LG.VENETA 10
PARTITO DEMOCRATICO 7 L.VEN-­L.NORD 9
POPOLARI 6 LISTA CIVICA 9
IND.SIN. 5 UDC 9
PER VERONA 5 CCD-­CDU 7
PROGRESSISTI SALERNO 5 DESTRA 7
SDI-­ALTRI 5 FI-­CCD 5
FED.DEI VERDI 4 FI-­CCD-­AN 5
UNITI NELL'ULIVO 4 POLO BUON GOVERNO 5
ALL. DI PROGRESSO 3 CDL 4
CENSIN 3 CENDES 4
I DEMOCRATICI 3 LG.VENETA REPUBBLICA 4
LA MARG. 2 U.D.EUR 3
SDI 2 U.D.EUR POPOLARI 1
SOCIALISTIALTRI 2 FI-­CCD-­CDU 1
U.D.EUR 2 FORZA IT.-­POLO POP. 1





TOTAL 4,053 2,489 376
Notes: Frequencies record the number of elected mayors in large municipalities classified as supported by each party.
U.D.EUR and U.D.EUR POPOLARI are classified as a Center-­Left party for the years 2006-­2008 when they supported the
center-­left government.




as % of total
municipalities
% of residents in
large
municipalities
% of total grants to
large municipalities
2002 9.41% 60.87% 65.97%
2003 9.41% 60.86% 64.93%
2004 9.41% 60.99% 65.55%
2005 9.41% 60.80% 66.23%
2006 9.41% 60.84% 65.98%
2007 9.41% 60.65% 68.86%
2008 9.41% 60.55% 70.64%
2009 9.41% 60.50% 70.49%
2010 9.41% 60.54% 69.33%
2011 9.41% 60.23% 68.90%
Table AA6. Distribution of elections by first round and second round
(regression sample)
year









1998 4 12 16 17 11 28 44
1999 13 84 97 34 38 72 169
2000 7 10 17 12 16 28 45
2001 22 17 39 25 25 50 89
2002 40 34 74 19 34 53 127
2003 11 15 26 6 14 20 46
2004 16 105 121 27 39 66 187
2005 15 24 39 3 21 24 63
2006 27 39 66 17 23 40 106
2007 40 23 63 35 19 54 117
2008 14 7 21 20 16 36 57
Total 209 370 579 215 256 471 1050
Table AA7. Local elections by coalition and margin of victory (regression sample)
year













1998 21 23 3 1 0 0
1999 47 122 12 10 4 3
2000 19 26 2 4 2 1
2001 47 42 4 6 1 1
2002 59 68 7 8 5 4
2003 17 29 1 1 0 1
2004 43 144 12 8 7 5
2005 18 45 3 5 1 3
2006 44 62 8 5 1 2
2007 75 42 6 4 3 1
2008 34 23 4 3 4 2
Total 424 626 62 55 28 23
Table AA8. Local elections by coalition and alignment status (regression sample)
year
All sample MV < 5% MV < 2%
Aligned Not-­Aligned Aligned Not-­Aligned Aligned Not-­Aligned
1998 21 23 3 1 0 0
1999 47 122 12 10 4 3
2000 19 26 2 4 2 1
2001 42 47 6 4 1 1
2002 68 59 8 7 4 5
2003 29 17 1 1 1 0
2004 144 43 8 12 5 7
2005 45 18 5 3 3 1
2006 44 62 8 5 1 2
2007 75 42 6 4 3 1
2008 23 34 3 4 2 4
Total 557 493 62 55 26 25
Table AA9. Descriptive statistics, means and standard deviations by margin of alignment,














Current grants from central
government, real euro per-­capita 155.88 161.84 151.94 92.12 90.90 91.13
Current grants from regional
government, real euro per-­capita 46.66 48.52 48.76 46.07 46.82 54.35
Total municipal taxes (property +
income tax) -­ real euro per capita 229.54 232.40 251.87 80.05 79.15 69.92
Current municipal fees real euro per-­
capita 258.33 258.69 279.58 133.63 134.87 149.21
Current municipal expenditure
real euro per-­capita 755.15 767.51 808.89 190.85 201.26 185.98
1 = if incumbent mayor is re-­elected 0.6703 0.6250 0.4545 0.4710 0.4880 0.5096
1 = if incumbent party is re-­elected 0.6778 0.6456 0.4839 0.4680 0.4814 0.5080
Margin of victory, municipal election 12.4520 3.8259 3.3667 9.6211 5.0825 7.0532
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
central government 0.4855 0.5010 0.5450 0.4999 0.5005 0.4992
1 = if municipality is aligned with the
regional government 0.4854 0.5010 0.5400 0.4999 0.5005 0.4992
Resident population 52,574 67,797 49,734 174,964 257,521 71,367
Percentage of residents under15 years
old 15.04 14.83 13.91 3.13 3.30 2.49
Percentage of residents over 65 years
old 16.79 17.03 18.04 4.32 4.22 3.93
Income different form real estate real
euro per-­capita 16,713 16,994 18,056 3,323 3,168 2,770
Income from real estate, real euro per-­
capita 1,743 1,756 1,852 514 511 556
Electoral cycle (0 = election year,
4 = year before election) 1.804 1.844 1.775 1.361 1.376 1.365
Local government dummy
(1 = left council) 0.5513 0.4723 0.4350 0.4975 0.4997 0.4970
Central government dummy
(1 = left central government) 0.3019 0.3018 0.2800 0.4592 0.4595 0.4501
Number of observations: All sample = 2,097 MV < 5% =487 MV < 5% = 200
Table AA10. Testing for flypaper effect, determination of current expenditures net of grants from central government and regional
governments (Euros per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(baseline model) (polynomial instruments) (optimal bandwidth)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Net Grants Net Grants Net Grants Net
Variable
Expenditur
e Expenditure Expenditure Expend.
Grant -­0.858*** -­0.638*** -­0.623*** -­0.405***
(0.047) (0.212) (0.140) (0.185)
Income (per capita) -­0.003 0.012*** -­0.006 0.013*** -­0.006 0.023*** -­0.011
(0.007) (0.002) (-­0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009)
Alignment dummy 12.86*** 42.53*** 23.99***
(1.365) (6.911) (5.92)
MA (fourth order polynomial) no yes no
MA (first order polynomial) no no yes
Observations 3546 3546 3546 3141 3141 856 856
R-­squared 0.432
F-­test on joint significance covariates
(F-­statistics) 88.74 19.92 34.14
Sargan-­Hansen statistic Chi-­sq (8) 15.40 (2) 4.259
Ho: valid excluded instrument (p-­
value) 0.051 0.118
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.016 0.016 0.000
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Controls include: Resident population, Percentage of residents under15 years old, Percentage of residents over 65 years old, Electoral cycle, Local government
dummy (1 = left council), Central government dummy (1 = left central government), Municipal alignment with the regional government dummy (1 = aligned
municipality), Current grants from regional government (real euro per-­capita).
Table AA11. Testing for flypaper effect, determination of current expenditures (Euros per capita)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
(baseline model) (polynomial instrument) (optimal bandwidth)
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Dependent Current Grants Current Grants Current Grants Current
Variable Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures Expenditures
Grant 0.142*** 0.362* 0.377*** 0.595***
(0.0478) (0.211) (0.140) (0.185)
Income (per capita) -­0.00374 0.011*** -­0.00631 0.013*** -­0.006 0.023*** -­0.011
(0.00770) (0.002) (0.00497) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.048)
Alignment dummy 12.92*** 42.53*** 23.99***
(1.27) (6.91) (5.92)
MA (fourth order polynomial) no yes no
MA (first order polynomial) no no yes
Observations 3546 3546 3546 3141 3141 856 856
R-­squared 0.149
F-­test on joint significance covariates
(F-­statistics) 88.74 19.92 34.14
Sargan-­Hansen statistic Chi-­sq (8) 15.40 (2) 4.29
Ho: valid excluded instrument (p-­
value) 0.051 0.118
Hausman test (Prob>chi2) 0.034 0.034 0.000
Control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Municipality Fixed Effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes. Significance at 1% is represented by *** , at 5% by ** and at 10% by *. Robust standard errors in brackets clustered at municipal level.
Controls include: Resident population, Percentage of residents under15 years old, Percentage of residents over 65 years old, Electoral cycle, Local
government dummy (1 = left council), Central government dummy (1 = left central government), municipal alignment with the regional government dummy
(1 = aligned municipality), Current grants from regional government (real euro per-­capita).
